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 Non-Technical Summary 
Start-ups are a vehicle to transfer knowledge and technology within an economy. The way in which 
this occurs is that founders of start-ups pick up ideas that otherwise would have been neglected and 
bring them to the market. A group of start-ups which are especially apt to spread knowledge and tech-
nology are start-ups by previous employees of incumbent firms, usually called corporate spinoffs. The 
founders of these start-ups are assumed to transfer intellectual assets encountered during their em-
ployment. In this paper, we examine whether the transfer of ideas and skills from incumbent firms 
affects the employment growth and post-entry innovation activities of new firms. 
A key contribution of our paper is that we apply a definition of corporate spinoff which directly draws 
on the notion of knowledge and technology transfer. The data set we use is the KfW/ZEW Start-Up 
Panel. It has explicit information on the importance of new ideas and skills that the founders devel-
oped during employment for setting up the firm. We classify a start-up as corporate spinoff if a new 
idea that emerged from the founders’ work for an incumbent firm has been essential for establishing 
the new firm. We apply propensity score matching in order to determine whether this idea is causally 
related to the employment growth and innovation activities of the corporate spinoff. As control group 
we use start-ups by previous employees for which such an idea has not been essential. We also analyse 
whether an idea that was at least of great importance and skills that were essential for establishing the 
firm affect these outcome indicators. 
Our findings indicate that the transfer of an essential idea leads to higher post-entry innovation activi-
ties but not to higher employment growth. Start-ups that are based on an idea of at least great im-
portance benefit from the idea both in terms of innovation activities and employment growth. Howev-
er, essential skills have hardly any effect on these indicators. We conclude that a transferred idea is 
primarily an input factor and a stimulus for subsequent innovation activities of start-ups. In addition, 
our results show that it is important to carefully differentiate between varying types of knowledge and 
technology transfer. Start-ups do not benefit from all types to the same degree. With respect to innova-
tion activities it is rather ideas that matter than skills. 
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Gründungen können als Vehikel des Wissens- und Technologietransfers angesehen werden. Dies ge-
schieht in der Weise, dass Gründer Ideen kommerzialisieren, die sonst vernachlässigt worden wären. 
Eine Gruppe von Gründungen, die besonders geeignet ist, Wissen und Technologien zu verbreiten, 
sind Gründungen von ehemaligen Beschäftigten etablierter Unternehmen. Sie werden gewöhnlich als 
Corporate Spinoffs bezeichnet. In diesem Papier untersuchen wir, ob der Transfer von Ideen und Fä-
higkeiten aus bestehenden Unternehmen das Beschäftigungswachstum und die Innovationsaktivitäten 
neuer Unternehmen beeinflusst. 
Ein wichtiger Beitrag unseres Papiers ist, eine Definition von Corporate Spinoffs zu verwenden, die 
direkt auf den Wissens-und Technologietransfers abzielt. Das für die Untersuchung verwendete 
KfW/ZEW-Gründungspanel enthält explizite Informationen zur Bedeutung von Ideen und Fähigkei-
ten, welche die Gründer in ihrer vorherigen Beschäftigung entwickelt haben, für die Gründung des 
Unternehmens. Wir klassifizieren eine Gründung als Corporate Spin-off, wenn eine neue Idee, die 
während der Arbeit der Gründer für ein etabliertes Unternehmen entstanden ist, unverzichtbar für die 
Gründung war. Wir verwenden das Propensity Score Matching-Verfahren, um festzustellen, ob diese 
Idee kausal mit dem Beschäftigungswachstum und den Innovationsaktivitäten von Corporate Spinoffs 
zusammenhängt. Als Kontrollgruppe dienen Gründungen von ehemaligen Beschäftigten, für die eine 
solche Idee nicht unverzichtbar war. Außerdem untersuchen wir, ob eine Idee, die zumindest von gro-
ßer Bedeutung war, und Fähigkeiten, die unverzichtbar für die Gründung waren, einen kausalen Effekt 
auf die Ergebnisvariablen haben. 
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Transfer einer unverzichtbaren Idee zu höheren Innovationsaktivi-
täten, aber nicht zu mehr Beschäftigungswachstum führt. Gründungen, die auf einer Idee von mindes-
tens großer Bedeutung basieren, profitieren von der Idee sowohl in Bezug auf Innovationsaktivitäten 
als auch auf Beschäftigungswachstum. Unverzichtbare Fähigkeiten haben jedoch kaum Einfluss auf 
die Ergebnisvariablen. Wir schließen daraus, dass eine transferierte Idee in erster Linie ein Inputfaktor 
und ein Impuls für nachfolgende Innovationsaktivitäten von Gründungen ist. Außerdem zeigen die 
Ergebnisse, dass es wichtig ist, sorgfältig zwischen den unterschiedlichen Arten des Wissens- und 
Technologietransfers zu unterscheiden. Gründungen profitieren nicht von allen Arten gleichermaßen. 
Im Hinblick auf Innovationsaktivitäten sind es eher Ideen, die zählen, als Fähigkeiten. 
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1 Motivation 
One of the expectations connected with start-ups is that they contribute to the knowledge and technol-
ogy transfer within an economy. This transfer in turn is expected to make an economy more competi-
tive by increasing the quantity and quality of innovation which then leads to sustainable jobs. From 
this perspective, corporate spinoffs have received considerable attention in the literature. Spinoff 
founders are assumed to transfer intellectual assets encountered as an employee of an incumbent firm 
to the spinoff firm (Agarwal et al., 2004; Franco and Filson, 2006). If corporate spinoffs play an im-
portant role in knowledge and technology transfer, they should be particularly qualified for meeting 
the expectations and create both jobs and innovations. 
In this paper, we examine whether knowledge transferred from the incumbent firm causally affects 
employment growth and post-entry innovation activities of corporate spinoffs. A key contribution of 
our paper is to use a definition of corporate spinoffs which directly draws on the notion of knowledge 
and technology transfer. We use the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, a unique data set on German start-ups 
that comprises explicit information on whether a new idea that the founder developed as an employee 
in a private company has been essential for setting up the firm. This allows us to define corporate 
spinoffs by the transfer of a new idea and distinguishes our paper from related studies that define 
spinoffs as start-ups whose founders were previously employed in the same industry (e.g. Klepper 
2001; Franco and Filson, 2006). 
Previous studies on corporate spinoff performance have analysed, to the best of our knowledge, only 
survival. Although survival must be all firms’ first and foremost objective, other measures of firm 
outcome concern researchers and policy makers too. Most of all, start-ups and young firms are ex-
pected to create new jobs. Whether corporate spinoffs outperform other start-ups in terms of employ-
ment growth and insofar can be considered as ‘job machines’ is still an open research question. Fur-
thermore, innovation activities of start-ups are of primary interest because innovative start-ups were 
shown to be an integral part of an economy’s innovation system (Aghion et al., 2006; Acs and 
Audretsch, 1990). Start-ups’ and young firms’ innovative contribution is not restricted to those prod-
ucts and services the start-up commercialises at market entry but also comprises recurrent post-entry 
innovation activities (Arvanitis and Stucki, 2010). Whether corporate spinoffs are ‘think tanks’ in the 
sense that they are entities with enduring superior research and innovation activities compared to other 
start-ups, is likewise not yet answered and is addressed by our paper. Our main finding is that a trans-
fer of new ideas increases innovation activities after start-up but does not enhance corporate spinoffs’ 
employment growth. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we summarise the relevant theoretical and empirical find-
ings on corporate spinoffs. In section 3, we describe our data set and our strategy of identifying corpo-
rate spinoffs. In section 4, descriptive results are shown for corporate spinoffs in comparison with 
other start-ups. The estimation method is explained in section 5. Section 6 discusses the results and 
section 7 concludes. 
2 Previous Research 
The influence the transfer of intangible assets has on the formation and the subsequent development of 
new firms has been studied intensively in previous literature. Transferred intangible assets may origi-
nate from various sources like universities, public research institutes, public companies or private 
companies. Start-ups that are based on research from academic institutions, usually denoted as aca-
demic spinoffs or university spinoffs, and the role the transferred intangible assets play for the aca-
demic spinoffs’ employment growth and innovation activities have been investigated by an increasing 
number of studies (see Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008, or O’Shea et al., 2008, for an overview and 
Lejpras and Stephan, 2011, for an example of a study on academic spinoffs’ innovation activities). 
Corporate spinoffs are typically defined to be start-ups whose founders previously worked as employ-
ees for an incumbent firm in the same industry (Garvin, 1983; Klepper 2001, 2002; Agarwal et al. 
2004, Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Franco and Filson, 2006; Buenstorf, 2007; Cabral and Wang, 2009). 
Sometimes the terms ‘spin-outs’ (Agarwal et al., 2004; Franco and Filson, 2006), ‘employee spinoffs’ 
(Muendler et al., 2012) or ‘entrepreneurial spinoffs’ (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002) are used to distin-
guish corporate spinoffs from entrants in an industry which are founded by established firms and 
which are often controlled by the parent firm. The latter are called ‘divestitures’ or ‘parent spinoffs’ 
(Muendler et al., 2012; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). Similar to academic spinoffs, it is assumed that 
the founders of corporate spinoffs use knowledge, skills and ideas they encountered during their time 
as employees thereby transferring knowledge and technology from one economic unit to another 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Franco and Filson, 2006). 
Corporate spinoffs (referred to as ‘spinoffs’ below for convenience) have been found to play a major 
role in the development of certain industries such as semiconductors (Braun and MacDonald, 1978), 
disk drives (Franco and Filson, 2006), lasers (Buenstorf, 2007; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) and auto-
mobiles (Klepper, 2002). Several arguments have been put forward to explain the emergence of 
spinoffs. First, problems in designing incentive-compatible contracts prevent discoveries made by 
employees being commercialised in an incumbent firm (Wiggins, 1995; Anton and Yao, 1995). Sec-
ond, employees become frustrated at their workplaces. This frustration can arise when firms do not 
develop both their technological and market pioneering know-how so that employees get the impres-
sion that opportunities are neglected (Agarwal et al., 2004), ideas of employees are not sufficiently 
recognised, the management practices with respect to the organisation or the methods of rewarding 
employees are perceived to be poor or employees disagree with the strategic direction of their employ-
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er (Garvin, 1983; Klepper and Thompson, 2010). Third, employees want to exploit knowledge that 
they encountered during their work in an established firm. Incumbent firms normally do not exploit all 
arising opportunities because, for example, they fear cannibalising effects on their current activities 
(Agarwal et al., 2004) or losing customers as a result of new products or services not matching the 
preferences of the current clients (Christensen, 1993). Sometimes incumbent firms also do not recog-
nise an opportunity but an employee does (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). Fourth, spinoffs are the result 
of a reorganisation or a crisis of the incubator firm. For instance, a firm is taken over by a firm from 
another industry, a new CEO is hired from outside the firm, or the growth rates of the firm slow down 
(Brittain and Freeman, 1986). And fifth, employees feel that they would make good entrepreneurs 
(Cabral and Wang, 2009). 
With the exception of the last two explanations, all explanations are based on the notion that spinoffs 
involve some sort of innovation and come along with knowledge and technology transfer between 
firms. However, this notion is not directly reflected in the prevalent definition and operationalisation 
of spinoffs in the literature. The mere fact that founders worked for an incumbent firm in the same 
industry does not necessarily imply a transfer of knowledge and technologies. It is possible that the 
founders developed a business idea that does not originate from their former employment and that they 
make only little use of the knowledge they encountered there. Furthermore, the definition is imprecise 
insofar as it leaves open what is exactly meant by ‘the same industry’. Classification of sectors is al-
ways arbitrary to some extent. Consequently, empirical studies report very different results regarding 
the quantitative importance of spinoffs. For example, reported shares of spinoffs in all start-ups vary 
between 45 and 71% for the US (Cooper, 1985; Bureau of the Census, 1997; Bhidé, 2000). The defini-
tion also misses out many ‘vertical’ spinoffs (Muendler et al., 2012) which occur across industries. 
Alternative spinoff definitions require that a substantial share of a spinoff’s employees (25% or 50%, 
depending on the definition used) come from the same workplace (which does not have to belong to 
the same industry as the start-up) (Muendler et al., 2012; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006). Although em-
ployee flows do not necessarily imply a transfer of intellectual assets, the volume of transfer tends to 
be larger the more employees have moved from the former workplace. 
The transfer between the incubator firm and the spinoff encompass a variety of assets. These include 
technologies (Garvin, 1983; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Muendler et al., 2012), knowledge about 
technologies (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2004), ideas (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper 
and Sleeper, 2005), market specific knowledge (knowledge about consumer needs, industry condi-
tions, country or regional conditions; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2004; Rauch and 
Watson, 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005), management expertise (Agarwal et al, 2004; Gompers et 
al, 2005), communication practices (Phillips, 2002), rules, routines, procedures (Agarwal et al., 2004; 
Muendler et al., 2012), personal networks (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006), 
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skilled labour (Garvin, 1983), financial capital (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002), and patents, trademarks, 
brand names and designs (Garvin, 1983; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). 
If actually transferred, these assets can affect the development of spinoffs. Many authors have argued 
that spinoffs can be expected to benefit from this transfer in terms of performance (Klepper, 2002; 
Agarwal et al., 2004; Buenstorf, 2007; Cabral and Wang, 2009; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006). A common 
finding is that spinoffs outperform other start-ups in terms of survival (Sleeper, 1998; Phillips, 2002; 
Agarwal et al., 2004; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006; Dahl and Reichstein, 2007; Buenstorf, 2007; Muen-
dler et al., 2012). However, it is not clear from this literature whether the higher survival rates of 
spinoffs are the result of a knowledge and technology transfer because the applied definition of 
spinoffs does not reflect whether such transfer actually took place. 
In this paper, we define a start-up to be a corporate spinoff if a new idea that the founder developed 
during employment in a private company has been essential for setting up the firm. Our perception of 
a new idea refers to new products, new technologies, new production processes or new management 
concepts. The approach of identifying corporate spinoffs in our data is related to the procedure used by 
Egeln et al. (2003) and Egeln et al. (2009) to identify academic spinoffs in Germany and Austria. It 
has been proven to reliably single out start-ups which come along with a substantial knowledge and 
technology transfer from academic institutions from all start-ups established in knowledge and tech-
nology intensive sectors. 
Applying nearest neighbour propensity score matching, we examine whether knowledge or technology 
transferred from an established firm to a corporate spinoff affects employment growth and post-entry 
innovation activities of spinoffs. Technically speaking, we are interested in the Average Treatment 
Effect of the Treated (ATT) with ‘spinoff’ (i.e. having received knowledge or technology transfer 
from an established firm) as treatment. 
3 Data and identification of corporate spinoffs 
3.1 Data set 
We use data from the first three survey waves of the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel (KfW/ZEW-
Gründungspanel), a unique panel data set on newly founded firms in Germany. This data set was es-
tablished in 2008 by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), KfW Bankengruppe (Ger-
many’s largest state owned promotional bank) and Creditreform (Germany’s largest credit rating 
agency) in order to analyse the development of start-ups over time. The data is collected once a year 
using Computer-Aided Telephone Interviews (CATI). The target size of the survey totals to an average 
of 6,000 interviews per year. 
The statistical unit of the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel is the legally independent firm. De-mergers and 
subsidiaries are excluded from the survey. The sample is stratified by three criteria: (i) year of firm 
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formation, (ii) industry (10 sectors as defined in Table 12 in the appendix), and (iii) whether or not the 
firm has received financial support by KfW. Each year, a random sample of firms is drawn which have 
been founded during the three years prior to the year of the survey. Firms that have participated in the 
survey are contacted in subsequent years as long as they are not older than eight years. One half of the 
firms included in the sample operate in high-technology industries.1 
Firms that participate in the survey for the first time are asked to answer a baseline questionnaire on 
characteristics of firm founders (e.g. age, gender, education) and on structural properties of firms at the 
time of start-up.2 Firms that already participated in previous waves answer a follow-up questionnaire 
that focuses on changes over time, e.g., changes in the number of employees or in long-term innova-
tion behaviour. Besides information collected every year, a focus theme is included into each year’s 
follow-up questionnaire. In the third survey wave conducted in 2010, there was a special topic on cor-
porate spinoffs. 4,103 firms founded between 2005 and 2008 participated in the 2010 follow-up sur-
vey. 
3.2 Identification of corporate spinoffs 
In order to identify spinoffs, firms were first asked whether at least one of the founders worked as a 
dependent employee in a private company. Previous employment in a private company is the neces-
sary condition for a start-up to be classified as a spinoff. All start-ups with at least one founder previ-
ously working for a private company were then asked about the importance of two different measures 
of knowledge transfer for the establishment of the new firm: (i) specific skills that the founder has 
acquired during her work for the private company; (ii) new ideas that emerged from the founder’s 
work for the private company. The interviewees had to assess whether the new ideas or the acquired 
specific skills were ‘essential’, ‘of great importance’, ‘of minor importance’ or ‘of no importance’ for 
the formation of their own firm. In case of a team foundation, interviewees had to assess the im-
portance of new ideas and specific skills of any of the founders.3 
86% of the firms participating in the 2010 follow-up survey have been established by at least one 
founder previously employed by a private company, which corresponds to 3,504 observations. Using 
population weights that correct for the stratification design of the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel we find 
that 84% of all start-ups founded in the period from 2005 to 2008 fall into this group. Firms in which 
none of the founders previously worked for a private company include firms that have been set up, for 
instance, by civil servants or other employees of public organisations, homemakers, and students or 
graduates from universities that started their own business immediately after graduation. 
                                                     
1 For a detailed description of the survey design see Fryges et al. (2010). 
2 Interviews are preferably conducted with one of the founders of the firm. If the founders are no longer active, a 
member of management that is also owner of the firm is interviewed. 
3 The wording of the questions used to identify spinoffs is documented in Table 13 in the appendix. 
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Table 1 refers to the sample of firms that were set up by a founder previously employed by a private 
company. It shows how the founder rates the importance of the knowledge transfer for the establish-
ment of her firm. For 10% of the firms, new ideas that emerged from the founder’s former employ-
ment were essential for the formation of the firm. Additionally 28% of the firms indicate that new 
ideas were of great importance for the establishment of the firm, 62% of the firms assign no or only 
minor importance to new ideas. Specific skills that the founders have acquired during their work for a 
private company were more frequently pointed out to be essential (33%) or of great importance (48%). 
Only a minority of the interviewees (19%) regard skills that they acquired during the employment in a 
private company as unimportant or at most of minor importance. In order to give a representative pic-
ture of the importance of knowledge transfer for the establishment of new firms in Germany, Table 1 
also reports population weighted shares. The population weighted shares do not differ significantly 
from the sample shares.4 
Table 1: Importance of knowledge transfer for the establishment of a new firm 
 ideas skills 
 N sample shares 
population-
weighted 
shares 
N sample shares 
population-
weighted 
shares 
Essential 342 9.8 7.6 1,143 32.7 28.6 
Great importance 969 27.9 26.4 1,677 48.0 45.9 
Minor importance 1,052 30.3 29.0 370 10.6 14.4 
No importance 1,113 32.0 37.0 301 8.6 11.2 
Total 3,476 100 100 3,491 100 100 
Note: Only firms with at least one founder who previously worked for a private company. 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculations. 
Obviously, founders are likely to benefit from employment in a private firm. They accumulate experi-
ence, knowledge and skills. It is hence not surprising that the majority of those founders that previous-
ly worked for a private company regard skills they acquired as essential or at least of great importance 
for the formation of their firm. However, in many theoretical models of the emergence of spinoffs they 
are based on some sort of innovation and commercialise innovative products or processes the incuba-
tor firm is either not willing or not able to commercialise itself (see section 2). In line with these mod-
els, we believe that the mere transfer of skills does not adequately characterise a spinoff. We think that 
the notion of spinoffs as innovation-based start-ups is better captured by the transfer of ideas and de-
fine a spinoff as a start-up for whose establishment new ideas that emerged from the founder’s work 
for a private company were essential. In other words: a spinoff is a start-up that could not have been 
established without the transfer and subsequent commercialisation of an idea the founder developed in 
                                                     
4 In the following we only document unweighted descriptive statistics. 
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the course of her work for a private company. According to this definition, the share of spinoffs in our 
sample amounts to 10%, which is equivalent to 342 observations (see Table 1). Please keep in mind 
that the sample in Table 1 comprises of only those start-ups that have at least one founder who previ-
ously worked for a private company. 
It is important to note that our definition of spinoffs covers ideas that were essential for the establish-
ment of the spinoff and not on ideas that were essential for the success of the spinoff. The founder of a 
spinoff wants to pursue and commercialise the new idea she developed. In this sense, the new idea is 
essential for the founder’s decision to start the spinoff. Whether or not the new idea is economically 
successful has to be proven on the market during the spinoff’s post-entry period. 
In order to get a deeper insight into the characteristics of the idea that was essential for the establish-
ment of the firm, the questionnaire asked all spinoffs to precisely describe this idea. When classifying 
these free-text responses, 39% of all spinoffs are based on the transfer of a technological idea they 
have incorporated either into a new good, new software or new production process. 38% are based on 
the invention of a new service, 9% were established with the idea to improve the quality of existing 
services or to enhance processes of service delivery. New management or marketing concepts account 
for 19% of the ideas.5 Frequently, the new ideas are rather incremental changes of existing goods, 
services, production processes or management concepts, e.g. a special catering service for allergic 
persons or a craftsman who invented an improved way of floor tiling. This matches with Klepper and 
Sleeper (2005) who observe that spinoffs in the laser industry offer variants of lasers produced by their 
incubator firms. 
A further differentiated picture of spinoffs emerges when we examine the relationship between the 
spinoff’s good or service and the incubator firm’s good or service. 66% of all spinoffs in the data set 
entered the market with a similar but improved product, another 8% of the firms produce a similar 
product without any further improvement compared to the incubator firm’s product. Thus, about three 
quarters of spinoffs operate in the same industry as their incubator firm. However, a significant share 
of spinoffs operates at another stage in the value added chain, and accordingly in a different industry, 
acting as suppliers or customers (17% and 6% of the spinoffs respectively) of the incubator firms. 
4 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Setup of the baseline model 
The subsequent empirical analysis requires choosing the selection of a group of start-ups to which 
spinoffs will be compared and the choice of the observation year of firm outcome. We setup a baseline 
model for both the descriptive analyses and the subsequent econometric examinations. 
                                                     
5 Some interviewees indicated more than one idea, therefore the sum of shares exceeds 100%. 
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In our baseline setting, spinoffs (342 firms) are compared to start-ups that (like spinoffs) have at least 
one founder who previously worked for a private company, but for which (unlike spinoffs) new ideas 
from the founder’s previous employment were not essential. We refer to this comparison group as 
‘non-spinoffs’. According to the left column of Table 1, the comparison group of non-spinoffs encom-
passes 3,134 firms. We require that the founders of the non-spinoffs were previously employed by a 
private company because we expect start-ups of the same origin to be a more appropriate comparison 
group. Moreover, the restriction allows us to consider variables that characterise the founder’s occupa-
tion in the private company when estimating the probability of observing a spinoff. We choose 2009 
as the observation year of employment growth and innovation activities because 2009 is the only year 
for which data on employment and innovations are available for all spinoffs in the data set. In sections 
6.2 to 0, we will depart from this baseline setting and analyse whether or not the results will change 
for different settings of the model. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics on employment growth 
Table 2 depicts the number of employees as well as measures of employment growth for spinoffs and 
the comparison group of non-spinoffs. The number of employees is measured in full-time equivalents 
and includes the number of founders, full-time and part-time employees, mini-jobbers6, apprentices 
and founders’ family members that work in the firm without being paid. At time of start-up, the num-
ber of employees of spinoffs averaged 2.7 employees. At the end of 2009, corporate spinoffs em-
                                                     
6 According to German law, mini jobbers are marginally employed persons who work either part-time or short-
time with a maximum annual salary of 4.800 Euro. 
Table 2: Employment in spinoffs and non-spinoffs 
 # obser-
vations mean 
percentiles 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Spinoffs        
Employees at start-up 298 2.71 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.25 
Employees 2009 302 5.68 1.00 2.00 3.25 6.25 11.25 
Geometric employment growth 
rate (in %) (start-up – 2009) a 293 19.36 -5.90 0.00 10.06 31.40 60.05 
Birch Index (start-up – 2009) a 288 9.97 -0.50 0.00 1.50 6.00 25.78 
Non-spinoffs        
Employees at start-up 2,818 2.38 1.00 1.00 1.50 3.00 4.50 
Employees 2009 2,849 4.11 1.00 1.00 2.25 4.50 8.50 
Geometric employment growth 
rate (in %) (start-up – 2009) a 2,772 14.76 -5.43 0.00 5.74 25.74 45.77 
Birch Index (start-up – 2009) a 2,769 6.04 -0.44 0.00 0.31 4.00 14.76 
a Observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles excluded. 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculations. 
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ployed on average 5.7 employees. The distribution of the number of employees is highly right-skewed. 
In 2009, for instance, the median number of employees of spinoffs amounts to 3.25 persons, 10% of 
spinoffs had 11.25 and more employees. 
The number of employees of non-spinoffs is slightly smaller than that of spinoffs both at start-up and 
in 2009. Non-spinoffs started their business with a mean number of 2.4 employees, which grew to an 
average of 4.1 employees at the end of 2009. Again, the distribution of the number of employees is 
right-skewed. In 2009, half of non-spinoffs employed at most 2.25 persons, the 10% largest non-
spinoffs had at least 8.50 employees. 
According to a t-test on the equality of means both the average number of employees at start-up and at 
the end of 2009 differ significantly between spinoffs and non-spinoffs (Table 3). The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is used to test three hypotheses: (i) that the distribution of the number of employees is 
different for spinoffs and non-spinoffs, (ii) that the distribution of the number of employees for 
spinoffs first order stochastically dominates the distribution for non-spinoffs, (iii) that the distribution 
of the number of employees for non-spinoffs first order stochastically dominates the distribution for 
spinoffs. As reported in Table 3, the first two hypotheses cannot be rejected for both the number of 
employees at start-up and in 2009, while the third hypothesis is clearly rejected. Thus, we can con-
clude that spinoffs are significantly larger in terms of the number of employees than non-spinoffs. 
Table 3: Tests for differences in employment between spinoffs and non-spinoffs 
 t-test for difference  
in means b
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p-value) c 
 
Xspinoff – 
Xnon-spinoff 
p-value difference: yes 
spinoffs  
f-o dominate  
non-spinoffs 
non-spinoffs 
f-o dominate 
spinoffs 
Employees at start-up 0.325 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.954 
Employees 2009 1.578 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.999 
Geometric employment growth 
rate (in %) (start-up – 2009) a 4.607 0.015 0.017 0.010 0.903 
Birch Index (start-up – 2009) a 3.933 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.920 
a Observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles excluded. 
b The t-test does not assume equal variances for both groups. 
c A p-value of 0.05 (or smaller) indicates that the hypothesis described in the header on the column cannot be rejected at an 
level of significance of 5% (or less). 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculations. 
The small size of start-ups impedes finding an appropriate outcome variable to measure employment 
growth, since a small change in the absolute number of employees is often associated with an extreme-
ly high employment growth rate. Therefore, we decided to use three different measures for employ-
ment growth for the period from start-up to the end of 2009: the annualised geometric employment 
growth rate, the Birch Index (Birch, 1987), and the absolute change in employment. As shown in Tab-
le 2, spinoffs exhibit on average an annual employment growth rate of 19%, whereas non-spinoffs 
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grow on average by 15% per year.7 Both the t-test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicate that the 
annual employment growth rate for spinoffs is significantly higher than for non-spinoffs (Table 3). 
As a second measure for employment growth we calculate the Birch Index (BI), which is a combina-
tion of absolute and relative growth and is defined as  
(1)  0
0
  tii ti i
i
EBI E E
E
, 
with ܧ௧௜ and ܧ଴௜ as the number of employees of firm i at the end and at the beginning of the growth 
period respectively. The Birch Index gives an average value of 9.97 for spinoffs, which exceeds the 
mean value of the Birch Index for non-spinoffs (6.04; see Table 2). Again, the t-test and the Kolmogo-
rov-Smirnov test prove that differences in both the mean and the entire distribution of the Birch Index 
between spinoffs and non-spinoffs are statistically significant (Table 3). 
Our third measure of employment growth is the number of new employees measured in full-time 
equivalents that entered the newly founded firm in the period from start-up to the end of 2009. The 
absolute change in the number of employees is divided into five classes: (i) reduction in employment 
since start-up, (ii) no change in employment, (iii) employment increase of up to one person, (iv) em-
ployment increase of more than one and up to five persons, (v) employment increase of more than five 
persons. Pearson’s ² tests on independence reveal that non-spinoffs exhibit a significantly higher 
share of firms with no change in employment, whereas the share of firms that extended their work-
force by more than five employees is significantly higher for spinoffs (Table 4). To sum up the results 
of the descriptive analysis of employment growth, we find that spinoffs exhibit significantly higher 
employment growth than non-spinoffs. This result holds for all three measures of employment growth. 
                                                     
7 Employment growth rate as well as the Birch Index and R&D intensity (see below) are trimmed by excluding 
observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles. We also experimented with different definitions of 
outliers but our core results remain unchanged. 
Table 4: Differences in the number of new employees from start-up to 2009 between spinoffs and 
non-spinoffs 
 
spinoff non-spinoff Pearson 
 ² (1) p-value # % # % 
Number of new employees:  < 0 42 14.09 388 13.76 0.025 0.875 
Number of new employees: 0 69 23.15 879 31.18 8.205 0.004 
Number of new employees: > 0 – 1 56 18.79 570 20.22 0.342 0.558 
Number of new employees: > 1 – 5 84 28.19 738 26.18 0.560 0.454 
Number of new employees: > 5 47 15.77 244 8.66 16.125 0.000 
Total 298 100 2,819 100   
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculations. 
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4.3 Descriptive statistics on innovation activities 
Analysing post-entry innovation activities, we distinguish between the input into the innovation pro-
cess and innovation output. As measure for innovation input we use a firm’s engagement in Research 
and Development (R&D). Our measures of innovation output are market novelties, product as well as 
process innovations. Following the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005), a market novelty is a product the firm 
is the first to introduce into the market. The market can be the firm’s local market, the national (read: 
German) market or the world market. In the latter case, we refer to this product as a world market nov-
elty. A product innovation is a new or significantly improved good or service that is new to the firm, 
i.e. it is an innovation for that firm. A process innovation is defined as a new or significantly improved 
process for the production of goods or services that is new to the firm, although it may have been im-
plemented by another firm before. 
As Table 5 shows, 43% of spinoffs in our data set conducted in-house R&D in 2009. The respective 
share for non-spinoffs amounted to 21%.8 Pearson’s ² test proves that this difference is statistically 
significant. A firm’s R&D intensity is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. In 2009, 
the mean R&D intensity of spinoffs was 7%. Non-spinoffs spent on average 3% of their total sales on 
R&D. The t-test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test prove that differences in both the mean and the 
entire distribution of the R&D intensity between the two groups are statistically significant. 
Table 5: Differences in innovation indicators in 2009 between spinoffs and non-spinoffs 
 spinoff non-spinoff Pearson  ² (1) p-value 
In-house R&D activities (0/1) 42.72 20.50 76.982 0.000 
World market novelty 10.33 4.27 21.597 0.000 
Market novelty 25.67 13.17 34.462 0.000 
Product innovation  49.17 32.97 31.599 0.000 
Process innovation 31.89 18.74 29.429 0.000 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculations. 
Innovation output is also significantly higher for spinoffs than for non-spinoffs. 10% of spinoffs intro-
duced a world market novelty in 2009 whereas only 4% of non-spinoffs did so. Almost half of spinoffs 
launched a product innovation in 2009 while it was only one third of non-spinoffs. Similar differences 
are found for process innovations. 
In our analysis of innovation activities we primarily focus on firms’ innovation behaviour in one ob-
servation year. However, for characterising firms as ‘think tanks’ a longer-term perspective on post-
                                                     
8 Please recall that the statistics displayed in Table 5 are unweighted sample shares. Since half of the firms sur-
veyed by the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel operate in a high-technology industry, the sample shares indicating 
innovation activities are upward biased. Using population weights reduces the share of spinoffs (non-spinoffs) 
that carried out in-house R&D in 2009 to 27% (14%). 
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entry innovation activities is useful. Restricting ourselves to those firms that participated in each of the 
three surveys of the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel available for our study, it turns out that 16% of spinoffs 
introduced a product innovation in each observation year from 2007 to 2009. By contrast, only 10% of 
non-spinoffs showed this pattern of innovation activities. Similarly, 10% of spinoffs and 4% of non-
spinoffs implemented a process innovation in each year from 2007 to 2009. These differences are sta-
tistically significant according to Pearson’s ² test.9 Thus, according to descriptive statistics, spinoffs 
are more innovative not only at one point in time but also over a longer time period after firm for-
mation. 
5 Estimation Method 
In order to determine the causal effect of being a spinoff on employment growth and post-entry inno-
vation activities we apply nearest neighbour propensity score matching. The basic idea of propensity 
score matching is to estimate the causal effect of a treatment, in our case being a spinoff, by compar-
ing the mean of outcomes of treated entities (spinoffs) with the mean of outcomes of a control group 
of non-treated entities (non-spinoffs). The matching approach aims that spinoffs in the treatment group 
and non-spinoffs in the control group share similar, ideally identical, observable pre-treatment charac-
teristics. Remaining differences in the mean outcome of both groups cannot then be attributed to vary-
ing observable pre-treatment characteristics but to the fact of being a spinoff. 
The average causal effect of being a spinoff, the average treatment effect of the treated, is given by 
(2) 1 0 1 0: 1 1 1ATT E Y Y spinoff E Y spinoff E Y spinoff                 , 
where 1 1E Y spinoff    is the expected outcome of spinoffs and 0 1E Y spinoff    is the ex-
pected outcome of the same firms if they were non-spinoffs. Since a spinoff cannot be observed in the 
regime of non-spinoffs, 0 1E Y spinoff    cannot be calculated using non-experimental survey 
data. However, as shown by Rubin (1977) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) the average counterfac-
tual outcome of a sample’s treated entities (spinoffs) can be estimated in an unbiased way by the out-
come of non-treated entities (non-spinoffs) – provided that both groups have similar, ideally identical, 
realisations of a vector X of pre-treatment characteristics.10 Equation (2) can then be written as 
(3) 1 0: 1, 0,ATT E Y spinoff X x E Y spinoff X x            . 
                                                     
9 The number of observations of firms with (world) market novelties is too small to report complete sequences of 
these innovation indicators. 
10 The underlying assumption is that treatment and outcome are independent for entities with the same realisa-
tions x of the vector X (Conditional Independence Assumption, CIA, also referred to as the unconfoundedness or 
selection on observables assumption). For the CIA to be valid, the vector X must include all covariates that sim-
ultaneously influence both treatment and outcome (cf. Rubin, 1977). 
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The vector X of pre-treatment characteristics may have a very high dimension. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) showed that it is possible to reduce the problem of multidimensionality by choosing a function 
of X, called a balancing score, as the conditioning variable. A valid balancing score is the conditional 
probability (propensity score) of being a spinoff that results from a probit estimation and is given by 
 ˆix  , the cumulated density function of the standard normal distribution. 
As Lechner (1999) argues, matching on the bounded propensity score leads to undesirable asymmetry 
if the predicted probability of receiving treatment is close to 0 or 1. Our data set contains a large num-
ber of non-spinoffs whose bounded propensity score is close to 0. We therefore follow Lechner (1999) 
and use the unbounded propensity score ˆix  instead of the bounded propensity score  ˆix   as the 
main matching variable. Standard errors of the ATT are calculated according to Abadie and Imbens 
(2006: p. 250).11 
The (unbounded) propensity score indicating the probability of whether or not a firm observed in the 
data set is a spinoff, is estimated using a vector of exogenous covariates X. This vector includes 
founder-specific variables measured at the time of start-up and variables that are related to the found-
er’s employment in the incubator firm, measured at the time when the founder left the incubator firm. 
The variables used as covariates are presented below. 
The age of the founder proxies the founder’s general professional experience in the year of start-up 
and is measured in logarithmic years. Since previous studies found out that the relationship between a 
person’s age and her creativity and innovative performance – as a prerequisite to develop a new idea – 
is inversely U-shaped (see, e.g., Frosch, 2009), we also included the squared value of age. In case of a 
team foundation, information on each member of the team of founders is available in the data set. In 
the econometric model, this information is aggregated by considering the age of the oldest founder. 
Besides general experience, we consider specific industry experience of the founder in the year of 
start-up, measured as the (logarithmic) number of years of working experience in the same sector of 
the start-up. In case of a team foundation, we observe the years of experience of the founder who 
worked the longest time period in the relevant industry. To account for a potential non-linear effect, 
we include the variable’s squared value into the regression model. 
The founders’ education enters the empirical model in two dimensions: the founder’s highest educa-
tional degree and her field of specialisation. The educational degree is differentiated into eight catego-
ries: doctoral degree (including a German Habilitation), university degree without a doctoral degree, 
degree from a university of applied sciences (Fachhochschule), university of corporate education 
                                                     
11 The asymmetry of the bounded propensity score is relevant for matching techniques others than one-to-one 
nearest neighbour matching. In order to test for the robustness of the chosen matching methodology, we experi-
mented with other matching techniques like nearest neighbour propensity score matching with calliper or kernel 
matching with varying bandwidths of the kernel function. The main conclusions, however, do not change. 
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(Berufsakademie/duale Hochschule), commercial college (Berufsfachschule or Handelsschule), master 
craftsman (Meister), vocational training, and no vocational qualification.12 Each educational degree is 
classified into four fields of specialisation: a degree in natural sciences (including medicine), engineer-
ing and technology, social sciences (including studies in law), and humanities. Please note that the 
indicators of the different fields of specialisation encompass both founders with a university degree 
and those with a vocational training. Thus, the studied chemist and the chemical laboratory worker are 
both classified into the field of natural sciences, the economist, the lawyer or the office clerk fall into 
the field of social sciences.13 14 
The foundation of the spinoff might have been supported or even initiated by the incubator firm. In 
order to support the spinoff, the incubator firm may allow its previous employee to patent an idea that 
she developed during her work for the incubator firm. This effect is accounted for by a dummy varia-
ble indicating firms with at least one founder whom a patent was granted prior to the start-up of the 
firm. 
The vector of founder-specific variables is completed by two dummy variables indicating whether a 
start-up had at least one female founder or at least one founder with a migration background. We fur-
ther include a dummy variable indicating firms that were established by a team of founders. 
Two sets of explanatory variables characterise the founder’s previous employment in a private compa-
ny. First, we classify the founders according to the position they occupied in their former firm. We 
distinguish between former executive directors, executive employees and other employees. The first 
two variables approximate experience in managing a company or corporate operations. Our second set 
of variables describes the former firm’s business unit the founder worked in: production, management, 
sales or research.  
The size of the incubator firm may have an effect on the probability of being a spinoff because, for 
instance, of different learning possibilities. The firm size of the former employer is measured by the 
(logarithmic) number of employees and its squared value. In case of a spinoff we include the size of 
the firm where the essential idea accrued, in case of a non-spinoff we consider the size of the founder’s 
last former employer. In case of a non-spinoff founded in a team we measure the size of the largest 
former employer of any of the founders. 
                                                     
12 For details on the German education system, see European Commission (2010) or, for a short overview, Euro-
pean Commission (2011). 
13 There are a small number of founders that could not be coded into the four predetermined fields of specialisa-
tion. This includes, e.g., founders with a degree in sport science or founders without a completed vocational 
training. 
14 If a firm was set up by a team of founders that hold different highest degrees this firm is represented by a set of 
dummy variables indicating these different degrees. As a consequence, the eight variables measuring educational 
degree are not orthogonal to each other. Thus, we do not have a base category for educational degree in the re-
gression equation. The same argument applies for the set of variables representing the four different fields of 
specialisation. 
15 
Finally, our regressions include sets of dummy variables for the stratification criteria industry sector, 
year of start-up (2005 to 2009), and promotion by KfW. Table 14 in the appendix reports mean values 
for all explanatory variables based on those observations that enter the baseline regression. Due to 
missing values in the covariates, the final sample that is used for the matching analysis comprises 
3,151 firms, 302 spinoffs and a comparison group of 2,849 non-spinoffs. From the latter the matched 
controls will be selected. 
6 Estimation Results 
6.1 Baseline model 
Table 6 shows the results of the probit regression for our baseline model, estimating the probability 
that a firm observed in the sample is a spinoff. Spinoffs tend to be firms with higher human capital 
endowment of founders than non-spinoffs. The probability that a firm is a spinoff is higher for start-
ups whose founders have a university degree than for start-ups whose founders have an educational 
degree below university level. The same holds for start-ups whose founders could gain leadership ex-
perience at their former employer. A reasonable explanation for this result is that both university grad-
uates and former directors or managers are better able to recognise business opportunities at the incu-
bator firm. A high level of formal education might put employees in a good position to combine and 
recombine information and knowledge in order to work out a business idea. The probability to observe 
a spinoff is also higher when the start-up is founded by a team. This might reflect the fact that team 
members were colleagues at the incubator firm.15 The probability to observe a spinoff is also related to 
founders’ industry experience. It increases with the industry experience of the founders up to about 11 
years and decreases afterwards. 
The probability to observe a spinoff increases if the founders worked in the R&D department at their 
former employer. It can be expected that a series of ideas emerges in R&D departments which can be 
further developed into business ideas. In addition, a start-up is more likely to be a spinoff if the found-
ers held patents before founding. 
The probability to observe a spinoff shows a U-shaped relationship with the size of the previous em-
ployer. It decreases up to a size of about 400 employees and increases afterwards. Small firms seem to 
lack the capabilities to implement the ideas employees come up with. On the contrary, employees’ 
ideas are more likely to be exploited within medium-sized incubator firms. In large firms, bureaucracy 
and established organisation structures may be impeding factors for pursuing new ideas (Hyytinen and 
Maliranta, 2008). 
                                                     
15 Unfortunately, this information is not available in our data to check this conjecture. 
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Table 6: Probit estimation of the probability of being a spinoff (baseline model) 
 marginal effect robust standard error 
 
Age of the (oldest) founder at start-up (ln) 0.220 0.533  
Age of the (oldest) founder at start-up (ln)2 -0.035 0.073  
Founder’s industry experience at start-up (ln) 0.063 0.022 *** 
Founder’s industry experience at start-up (ln)2 -0.013 0.006 ** 
Educational degree    
 PhD 0.098 0.043 *** 
 university 0.035 0.021 * 
 university of applied sciences 0.020 0.020  
 university of corporate education -0.001 0.033  
 commercial college 0.030 0.030  
 master craftsman -0.012 0.017  
 vocational training 0.009 0.018  
 no vocational training 0.022 0.052  
Field of specialisation    
 natural sciences -0.033 0.014 ** 
 engineering and technology -0.018 0.016  
 social sciences -0.008 0.015  
 humanities 0.001 0.025  
Own patents before start-up 0.119 0.050 *** 
Female founder -0.003 0.013  
Founder with migration background 0.001 0.020  
Team foundation 0.051 0.017 *** 
Founder’s position at previous employer    
 executive director 0.044 0.026 * 
 executive employee 0.044 0.020 ** 
 other employee 0.014 0.023  
Founder’s business unit at previous employer    
 production/provision of services 0.002 0.013  
 sales 0.009 0.012  
 administration 0.015 0.014  
 research 0.044 0.020 ** 
Size of previous employer (ln(number of employees)) -0.024 0.006 *** 
Size of previous employer (ln(number of employees))2 0.002 0.001 *** 
Industry (ref. wholesale and retail trade)    
 cutting-edge technology manufacturing 0.078 0.037 ** 
 high-tech manufacturing -0.013 0.025  
 technology-intensive services -0.001 0.019  
 software supply and consultancy 0.052 0.032 * 
 non-high-tech manufacturing 0.005 0.022  
 skill-intensive services 0.015 0.026  
 other business-oriented services 0.008 0.031  
 consumer-oriented services 0.041 0.026 * 
 construction 0.008 0.023  
Year of firm formation (ref. 2005)    
 2006 0.010 0.014  
 2007 0.014 0.014  
 2008 0.001 0.015  
Number of observations 3,151 
Log pseudolikelihood -925.496 
McFadden’s R2 0.070 
***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively and correspond to the test of the underlying coeffi-
cient being zero. Additional control variable indicating firms promoted by KfW included. 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
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Concerning industries, the probability to observe a spinoff increases when a firm is founded in cutting 
edge technology manufacturing. Compared to the reference industry wholesale and retail trade the 
probability to observe a spinoff is also positively affected if a firm is founded in the software sector or 
in consumer-oriented services. 
When applying nearest neighbour propensity score matching16, the quality of the match appears to be 
good.17 After matching, no significant differences in the observable pre-treatment characteristics be-
tween the groups were detectable, confirming the balancing property of the match. Table 15 in the 
appendix displays descriptive statistics of all pre-treatment variables after matching. The p-value of an 
LR-test for joint insignificance of all the regressors in a probit on the matched samples is at least 
0.92.18 
Table 7 shows the average treatment effect with respect to our outcome measures for the baseline 
model. Spinoffs do not benefit from an essential idea in terms of employment growth but in terms of 
                                                     
16 Propensity score matching was conducted using the Stata programme psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). 
17 The common support condition that requires that conditional on the vector X firms have a positive probability 
of being both spinoffs and non-spinoffs is fulfilled for all but six spinoffs. 
18 The p-value varies slightly depending on the outcome measure because not all outcome measures can be cal-
culated for all firms due to missing values. 
Table 7: Causal effect of being a spinoff on employment growth and innovations activities: base-
line model 
 
number of 
matched 
pairs 
spinoffs associated controls 
difference 
in out-
come 
standard 
error of 
difference 
 
Employment growth (start-up – 2009)      
Employment growth rate 287 0.194 0.166 0.029 0.026  
Birch Index 282 9.935 9.152 0.783 2.137  
Number of new employees: < 0 292 0.140 0.147 -0.007 0.028  
Number of new employees: 0 292 0.233 0.260 -0.027 0.037  
Number of new employees: > 0 – 1 292 0.192 0.192 0.000 0.035  
Number of new employees: > 1 – 5 292 0.281 0.264 0.017 0.039  
Number of new employees: > 5 292 0.154 0.137 0.017 0.030  
Innovation 2009      
In-house R&D activities (0/1) 296 0.416 0.260 0.155 0.039 *** 
R&D intensity  222 0.066 0.034 0.032 0.012 *** 
World market novelty 294 0.088 0.068 0.020 0.021  
Market novelty 294 0.245 0.177 0.068 0.034 ** 
Product innovation 295 0.485 0.366 0.119 0.041 *** 
Process innovation 295 0.312 0.220 0.092 0.039 ** 
Note: ***, **, * depict significance of the difference in outcome at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; standard errors of 
the ATT are calculated according to Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
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innovation. After matching, there are no significant differences in any measure of employment growth 
between spinoffs and non-spinoffs. However, spinoffs exhibit significantly higher innovation activities 
than non-spinoffs. This holds for all innovation measures except for the introduction of a world market 
novelty. 
An essential idea transferred from an incumbent firm can be interpreted either as an input factor into or 
a stimulus for the innovation process of the spinoff. In this way, the essential idea enables or at least 
initiates post-entry innovation activities within a spinoff. For example, if the idea constitutes a new 
technology developed by the spinoff’s founder this technology might be incorporated into various 
product innovations or it may offer the possibility and stimulate the spinoff to conduct in-house R&D 
in order to further develop this technology. The essential idea can also be interpreted as the founder’s 
past innovation experience she gained during her work for the incubator company. As Peters (2009) 
pointed out in her study of established firms, past innovation experience plays a major role in explain-
ing a firm’s generation of innovations over time, leading to persistence in a firm’s innovation activi-
ties. 
However, the treatment effect is not necessarily homogeneous. Some firms may benefit more from the 
transfer of an essential idea than others. Therefore, for all variables for which we found a significant 
effect on firm outcome we tested for homogeneity of the treatment effect. In doing so, we applied the 
Fully Integrated Linear Model (FILM) described by Goodman and Sianesi (2005). FILM is an OLS 
regression with firm outcome as dependent variable and the treatment variable, all covariates, and a 
full set of interactions between the treatment and all covariates as explanatory variables. The model is 
estimated using the full sample of spinoffs and non-spinoffs excluding those firms that do not fulfil the 
common support condition.19 The null hypothesis of no heterogeneity is tested using an F-test for joint 
significance of all interactions between the treatment variable and the covariates. The results of the F-
tests are shown in Table 8. Regarding the introduction of a market novelty and the implementation of 
process innovations the treatment effect turns out to be homogenous: all firms benefit in the same way 
from being a spinoff. On the contrary, the treatment effect on R&D activities and the introduction of 
product innovations is heterogeneous. 
FILM estimations also point out the sources of heterogeneity. The estimated coefficients of the inter-
action terms indicate that spinoffs that were set up by a founder with a degree in engineering or tech-
nology gain more from the transfer of an essential idea than other spinoffs (see Table 16 in the appen-
dix), although the probability to be a spinoff is not influenced by a founder’s degree in engineering or 
technology. The increase in R&D intensity is higher for spinoffs by founders who have a field of spe-
cialisation in social sciences and, interestingly, for spinoffs by founders without a vocational training. 
                                                     
19 The idea behind FILM is to make the OLS regression more flexible and to adjust it to propensity score match-
ing. However, FILM still assumes linearity whereas propensity score matching does not. The common support 
condition guarantees that FILM, in accordance to the matching approach, only analyses firms that are compara-
ble (cf. Goodman and Sianesi, 2005). 
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The treatment effect on R&D intensity further rises with spinoff founders’ industry experience. The 
impact on the probability of a product innovation increases if the founder of the spinoff holds a degree 
from a university of corporate education and has previously worked as a researcher, but it decreases if 
the founder worked in a sales department.20 
The interpretation of our results as an effect of being a spinoff is based on the assumption of selection 
on observables (Rubin, 1977). Unobserved factors that influence the probability of being a spinoff can 
lead to a selection bias and drive the estimated ATT to zero. As a robustness check, we conduct Man-
tel-Haenszel tests of the Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum, 2002) as described in Aakvik (2001) and 
Becker and Caliendo (2007). The tests indicate how strongly an unobserved variable must affect the 
selection into the treatment so that the estimated ATT vanishes. The methodology and the test results 
are discussed in detail in the technical Appendix to this paper. In short, the results show that being a 
spinoff is positively related to post-entry R&D activities even in presence of a ‘strong’ unobserved 
factor. The effect on the probability to introduce a product or a process innovation remains positive for 
a ‘moderate’ selection bias. However, we have to be cautious when interpreting the ATT on the prob-
ability to introduce a market novelty, since this treatment effect is not robust if an unobserved factor 
exists. 
Usually, innovation activities take some time. Thus, one might suspect that it is just the essential idea 
which is the basis of a spinoff’s business model that constitutes the innovation output observed in Tab-
le 7. However, we argue that this is not the case. First, the essential idea is not necessarily the same as 
a new product or a new service. Instead, for a significant number of spinoffs the essential idea is a new 
marketing or management concept (see section 3.2). Second, the innovation measures refer to the year 
2009, which is for most firms several years after foundation. Surely, there are a few start-ups which 
need up to several years of development time before the introduction of their product, in particular in 
selected high-tech manufacturing industries. However, only 15% of the spinoffs in our data set belong 
                                                     
20 Of course, FILM regressions can only provide a first insight into the sources of heterogeneity. A more in-
depth analysis is required but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Table 8: Test for homogeneity of the average treatment effect of the treated 
 F statistic p-value  
In-house R&D activities (0/1) 1.36 0.059 * 
R&D intensity  1.63 0.007 *** 
Market novelty 1.15 0.238  
Product innovation 1.47 0.026 ** 
Process innovation 0.91 0.642  
Note: Baseline model. F-test of no heterogeneous effects based on a fully integrated linear model; common support condition 
applies; ***, **, * depict significance of the test statistic at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
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either to cutting-edge or to high-technology manufacturing industries. Most relevant in terms of num-
bers are firms in the service sectors. It is not very likely that these firms introduce their business idea 
as late as three to five years after foundation. An indication that our conjecture is correct is that 88% of 
spinoffs had sales already in the calendar year of start-up, 62% of spinoff firms were able to break 
even in the first year. In order to make a sort of a test whether firms generated new knowledge in addi-
tion to the essential idea used for firm foundation, we performed nearest neighbour matching for an 
outcome variable indicating firms that exhibited products new to the firm in at least two years between 
start-up and 2009. For these firms we can be sure that they introduced at least one product innovation 
in addition to the idea which was essential for their foundation. The results show that being a spinoff 
significantly increases the probability to introduce product innovations in at least two years until 2009 
(estimated difference of matched pairs: 0.068, standard error: 0.037).21 
6.2 Spinoffs: age-specific effects 
The causal effect of an essential idea might depend on the age of the young firms. A reasonable pattern 
is that an effect on employment only appears when firms are older because the idea has to be estab-
lished in the market first. If we do not distinguish the firms by age it might be the case that the effect is 
concealed because we mix up times in the life of a young firm when there cannot be an effect (because 
the firm is too young) and times when there actually is an effect. In order to check whether there are 
age-specific effects we estimated the causal effects for each business year a firm is observed in the 
data. For example, for a firm in its second business year we calculate employment growth measures 
for the period from start-up until the end of the second business year. With respect to innovation we 
determine whether the firm had innovation input or innovation output in its second business year. 
Table 9 shows the average treatment effect by business year. In order to save space only differences in 
outcome variables are depicted. With respect to employment growth, significant effects appear only 
sporadically for particular growth measures and business years. In addition, these effects are only sig-
nificant at the 10% level. By contrast, we find significant effects for many innovation measures and 
ages. Obviously, spinoffs are more active in R&D than non-spinoffs over the whole time span that we 
observe them. Up to the fourth business year, they are also more successful in producing market nov-
elties, product and process innovations. 
                                                     
21 In the baseline model, the control group was constructed from the group of start-ups with at least one former 
employee of an established firm among the founders. It can be argued that all start-ups provide a better basis for 
the construction of the control group because they include, for example, academic spinoffs might be particularly 
suitable matching partners for corporate spinoffs. In order to check whether our results are influenced by the 
choice of the comparison group from which the control group is selected we replicated the analyses with the 
whole sample of firms. The results were essentially the same as the ones shown in Table 7. 
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Table 9: Causal effect of being a spinoff on employment growth and innovations activities: age-
specific estimations 
Differences in outcome in the … … 2nd business 
year 
… 3rd business 
year 
… 4th business  
year 
… 5th business 
year 
Employment growth         
Employment growth rate 0.004  -0.008  0.016  0.029  
Birch Index -1.397  0.941  2.073  8.661 * 
Number of new employees: < 0 -0.004  0.040  -0.016  0.017  
Number of new employees: 0 -0.034  -0.085 * -0.031  -0.117  
Number of new employees: > 0 – 1 0.023  0.027  -0.031  0.000  
Number of new employees: > 1 – 5 0.030  0.000  0.093 * 0.017  
Number of new employees: > 5 -0.015  0.018  -0.016  0.083  
Innovation activities         
In-house R&D activities (0/1) 0.189 *** 0.149 *** 0.137 ** 0.197 ** 
R&D intensity 0.037 * 0.045 ** 0.030  0.065 ** 
World market novelty 0.022  0.000  0.023  -0.085  
Market novelty 0.087 ** 0.071 * 0.107 ** -0.034  
Product innovation  0.089 * 0.070  0.122 ** 0.000  
Process innovation 0.047  0.106 ** 0.176 *** 0.083  
Note: ***, **, * depict significance of the difference in outcome at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, standard errors of 
the ATT are calculated according to Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
6.3 Start-ups for which the idea was of at least great importance 
Up to now, we based our definition of the treatment group on whether or not an idea has been essential 
for the establishment of a firm. However, this might be too narrow because founders are reluctant to 
call an idea essential or because there are not large differences between an essential idea and an idea of 
great importance. In this section, we analyse to what extent the results change if we also consider start-
ups whose founders ranked the idea they encountered during their work as employees for an incum-
bent firm to be of great importance as our treatment group. According to the left column of Table 1, 
the treatment group now involves 1,311 firms; the comparison group from which the matched controls 
are selected contains 2,165 firms (start-ups for which an idea was of minor or no importance). Apart 
from that, the conditions of our baseline model apply. 
As depicted in Table 10, we again find an effect on both innovation input and innovation output. In 
addition to our previous findings we also find an effect on the introduction of a world market novelty. 
Contrary to our previous results, a firm that is based on an idea of at least great importance has a high-
er growth rate and a higher Birch Index. Moreover, this firm is less likely to not grow and more likely 
to recruit more than five employees. A possible reason for the difference of these results in comparison 
to the results found in the previous sections is that ideas that were essential for the formation of a new 
firm distinguish from ideas that were ‘only’ of great importance. Indeed, the descriptions of the trans-
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ferred ideas in the open free-text fields reveal that ideas classified as essential more frequently concern 
highly specialised, customised products. Although this is no statistical proof, it supports the conjecture 
that essential ideas tend to target small niche markets that offer less possibilities to grow. In contrast, 
ideas of great importance tend to be designed to meet the requirements of the mass market. For the 
latter firms the transferred idea offers growth potential. 
6.4 Start-ups for which specific skills were essential 
As discussed in section 2, knowledge and technology transfer from one firm to another is not restricted 
to essential or important ideas. With the set of questions designed to classify spinoffs we are able to 
check the causal effect of specific skills that the founders acquired during their work for an incumbent 
firm. Among the start-ups of which at least one founder once worked for a private company we identi-
fy those start-ups whose founders indicate that the skills acquired at their former employer were essen-
tial for setting up the new firm. In order not to confound the impact of essential skills with that of es-
sential ideas we excluded spinoffs from the sample. Thus, this section’s analysis is based on 3,149 
observations, 931 firms where specific skills were essential and a comparison group of 2,218 firms 
where specific skills were not essential (right column of Table 1 disregarding spinoffs). 
Table 10: Causal effect of an idea of at least great importance on employment growth and inno-
vation activities 
 
number of 
matched 
pairs 
idea of at 
least great 
importance
associated 
controls 
difference 
in out-
come 
standard 
error of 
difference 
 
Employment growth (start-up – 2009)      
Employment growth rate 1,135 0.180 0.145 0.035 0.016 ** 
Birch Index 1,140 8.445 5.914 2.531 1.106 ** 
Number of new employees: < 0 1,165 0.136 0.156 -0.021 0.020  
Number of new employees: 0 1,165 0.253 0.303 -0.050 0.024 ** 
Number of new employees: > 0 – 1 1,165 0.194 0.191 0.003 0.022  
Number of new employees: > 1 – 5 1,165 0.294 0.269 0.026 0.024  
Number of new employees: > 5 1,165 0.123 0.081 0.042 0.016 *** 
Innovation activities 2009      
In-house R&D activities (0/1) 1,176 0.330 0.230 0.099 0.024 *** 
R&D intensity 910 0.054 0.034 0.020 0.008 ** 
World market novelty 1,166 0.077 0.048 0.029 0.013 ** 
Market novelty 1,166 0.206 0.133 0.073 0.020 *** 
Product innovation  1,171 0.436 0.331 0.105 0.026 *** 
Process innovation 1,174 0.265 0.191 0.074 0.022 *** 
Note: ***, **, * depict significance of the difference in outcome at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; standard errors of 
the ATT are calculated according to Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
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The probit estimation used to calculate the balancing score (Table 17 in the appendix) reveals that the 
probability to be a start-up for which specific skills were essential is – in contrast to the probability of 
being a spinoff – not positively influenced by a PhD or a university degree of the founder, by patents 
held before founding or by the founder’s previous work in an R&D department. Instead, the probabil-
ity that a start-up is based on essential skills increases if the founders are master craftsmen, hold a 
degree from a commercial college or previously worked in production or sales departments. Similar to 
the baseline model, a start-up is more likely based on essential skills if the founder has industry or 
leadership experience. Thus, the skills which were transferred and which have been essential seem to 
be skills related to craftsmen work in the first line. Table 11 shows that there is almost no effect on 
firm outcome when estimating the causal effect of specific skills acquired at a former employer. At 
least, the transfer of essential skills is associated with a lower probability to shrink and a higher proba-
bility to hire one new (possibly the first) employee during the initial business years after formation. 
This demonstrates that the effect on firm outcome has to be differentiated by the type of transferred 
knowledge. 
Table 11: Causal effect of essential specific skills on employment growth and innovation activi-
ties 
 
number of 
matched 
pairs 
specific 
skills  
essential 
associated 
controls 
difference 
in out-
come 
standard 
error of 
difference 
 
Employment growth (start-up – 2009)      
Employment growth rate 848 0.162 0.157 0.005 0.015  
Birch Index 843 6.227 6.449 -0.222 1.049  
Number of new employees: < 0 861 0.129 0.172 -0.043 0.020 ** 
Number of new employees: 0 861 0.287 0.281 0.006 0.026  
Number of new employees: > 0 – 1 861 0.221 0.182 0.038 0.021 * 
Number of new employees: > 1 – 5 861 0.266 0.271 -0.005 0.024  
Number of new employees: > 5 861 0.098 0.094 0.003 0.016  
Innovation activities 2009      
In-house R&D activities (0/1) 868 0.222 0.227 -0.005 0.022  
R&D intensity 693 0.031 0.028 0.003 0.006  
World market novelty 863 0.041 0.049 -0.008 0.012  
Market novelty 863 0.147 0.137 0.010 0.020  
Product innovation  865 0.354 0.331 0.023 0.026  
Process innovation 866 0.225 0.177 0.048 0.022 ** 
Note: ***, **, * depict significance of the difference in outcome at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; standard errors of 
the ATT are calculated according to Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
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7 Conclusion 
Start-ups are a way to spread technology and knowledge within an economy. Founders of start-ups 
may pick up ideas that otherwise would have been neglected and bring them to the market. A group of 
start-ups which are especially apt to spread technology and knowledge are corporate spinoffs. 
In this paper, we focused on German spinoffs founded in the period from 2005 to 2008. In identifying 
spinoffs we directly draw on the notion of knowledge and technology transfer and defined a start-up to 
be a corporate spinoff if a new idea that the founder developed during her time as an employee in a 
private company was essential for setting up the new firm. Whereas previous studies proved that 
spinoffs exhibit higher survival rates, we examined whether the property to be a spinoff causally af-
fects spinoffs’ employment growth rates and post-entry innovation activities. The analysis was con-
ducted applying nearest neighbour propensity score matching. 
Our key finding is that the transfer of an essential idea is associated with higher post-entry innovation 
activities but does not result in higher employment growth. The transferred essential idea works as an 
input factor for the innovation process and either enables or stimulates subsequent innovation activi-
ties. Although descriptive analyses showed that employment growth rates are significantly higher for 
spinoffs than for non-spinoffs, this difference cannot be traced back to the essential idea but appears to 
be a result of pre-treatment founder-specific characteristics, e.g. a better endowment with human capi-
tal. Consequently, spinoffs seem to be ‘think tanks’ but they are no ‘job machines’. Note, however, 
that this finding is sensitive to our definition of spinoffs. An outstanding result of our paper is that in 
order to assess the effect of a transfer of knowledge and technology from an incumbent firm to a new-
ly founded firm, it is important to carefully differentiate between varying types of knowledge and 
technology transfer. If we had included start-ups based on an idea of great importance into the group 
of spin-offs, results would indicate that this extended group of start-ups does not only show more 
comprehensive innovation activities but also exhibits higher employment growth. Obviously, trans-
ferred ideas distinguish from each other to the extent they offer growth opportunities to start-ups. This 
finding might be explained by the fact that essential ideas are more likely highly specialised, custom-
ised products that target small niche markets whereas ideas of great importance are more likely to be 
designed to meet the requirements of the mass market. Essential specific skills acquired by the founder 
during her work for an incumbent firm do not contribute to superior innovation activities but coheres 
with to a higher probability to employ one new (possibly the first) employee during the initial business 
years. In the first line, essential specific skills seem to be competences which serve as a basis for run-
ning a handicraft business. 
Our study has three major limitations. First, the definition of spinoffs applied in this study was moti-
vated by the literature of the emergence of spinoffs that most frequently refers to the transfer and sub-
sequent commercialisation of innovative products, processes or ideas. Nevertheless, possible transfers 
from an incubator firm to a spinoff are not restricted to knowledge, technologies and ideas but may 
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also encompass, among other things, skilled labour or financial capital. Of course, a transfer of skilled 
labour and financial capital may also contribute to the positive effect of being a spinoff on innovation 
activities. However, given the data at hand we are unable to single out the effects of transfers others 
than ideas and specific skills. 
Second, our results may be affected by a survival bias and an omitted variable bias. As discussed in 
the literature review in section 2, previous studies found that spinoffs exhibit a higher probability of 
survival than non-spinoffs. Unfortunately, we are unable to determine survival rates of spinoffs and 
non-spinoffs since firms are categorised as spinoffs and non-spinoffs respectively based on their re-
sponses to the survey. Thus, our results are conditional on firms that survived until the survey con-
ducted in 2010.22 An omitted variable bias may occur if we do not observe all variables relevant for 
estimating the probability of being a spinoff. Since propensity score matching assumes selection on 
observables (conditional independence assumption), an omitted variable would bias our results. As 
Lechner (1998) pointed out, it is impossible to check the validity of CIA with a statistical test. Thus, 
an omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out. The tests of the Rosenbaum bounds guide us where we 
have to be cautious when interpreting our results. 
Third, our analysis relates firm-specific and founder-specific characteristics measured at time of start-
up to post-entry outcome variables covering a time span from the second to the fifth business year. 
However, young firms experience profound changes in the first years of their existence. The longer the 
time span, the more difficult it is to argue that firm outcome is directly caused by the property of being 
a spinoff. Furthermore, from a dynamic perspective the different outcome variables mutually affect 
each other: A firm may invest in R&D which possibly results in an innovation output. The latter may 
improve the firm’s competitiveness which eventually leads to higher firm growth. Therefore, future 
research is required to formulate and estimate a dynamic model of spinoffs’ growth and innovation 
activities. 
                                                     
22 Note, however, that our results are confirmed by firms observed in their second business year, where the sur-
vival bias is presumably of minor importance. 
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Appendix 
Table 12: Composition of industry sectors 
 Sector NACE Rev. 2 
 High-technology industries  
1 Cutting-edge technology manufacturing  20.20, 21.10, 21,20, 24.46, 25.40, 26.11, 
26.20, 26.30, 26.40, 26.51, 26.60, 30.30, 
30.40, 32,50 
2 High-technology manufacturing 20.13, 20.14, 20.16, 20.17, 20.41, 20.51, 
20.53, 20.59, 22.11, 22.19, 23.19, 26.70, 
27.11, 27.12, 27.20, 27.40, 27.90,  
28.11–15, 28.23, 28.24, 28.29, 28.30, 
28.41, 28.49, 28.92–96, 28.99, 29.10, 
29.31, 29.32, 30.20 
3 Technology-intensive services 61.1–3, 62 (without 62.01), 63.1,  
71.1–2, 72.1 
4 Software supply and consultancy 62.01 
 Non-high-tech industries   
5 Non-high-tech manufacturing 10–33 (without sectors 1 and 2) 
6 Skill-intensive services (non-technical consulting services) 69.1–2, 70.2, 72.2, 73.1–2 
7 Other business-oriented services 49.2, 49.5, 50.2, 50.4, 51.2, 52, 53, 61.9, 
63.9, 64, 74.1, 74.3, 74.9, 77.1, 77.3–4, 
78, 80–82 
8 Consumer-oriented services 49.1, 49.3–4, 50.1, 50.3, 51.1, 55, 56,  
58–60, 65–66, 68, 74.2, 77.2, 79, 85.5–6, 
90–93, 95–96 
9 Construction 41–43 
10 Wholesale and retail trade (without trade agents) 45–47 (without 46.1) 
Cutting-edge manufacturing technology: manufacturing industries with average R&D expenditure > 7.0% of total sales. 
High-technology manufacturing: manufacturing industries with average R&D expenditure 2.5 – 7.0% of total sales.  
Source: own classification, classification of high-technology industries based on Legler and Frietsch (2006). 
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Table 13: Wording of questions that identify corporate spinoffs 
1 Was at least one founder sometime during his working life employed by a private company? 
2 In which business unit did the founders work there? 
 2-1 production/provision of services 
 2-2 sales 
 2-3 administration 
 2-4 research 
 2-5 other 
3 I will read out several factors that might have been relevant for the formation of your firm. 
Please tell me whether these factors were ‘essential’, ‘of great importance’, ‘of minor im-
portance’, or ‘of no importance.’ 
 3-1 Specific skills that at least one founder acquired during his work for the private  
company. 
 3-2 New ideas of at least one founder that accrued from his research.  
(interviewer instruction: founders in a research unit only) 
 3-3 New ideas of at least one founder that accrued from his work/from his work outside 
research for the private company. 
4 Which new ideas that were essential/of great importance for the establishment of your firm were 
it in concrete? 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel. 
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Table 14: Means of explanatory variables (baseline model) 
 spinoffs non-spinoffs p-value a 
Age of the (oldest) entrepreneur at start-up (in years) 41.41 40.90 0.352 
Entrepreneur’s industry experience at start-up (in years) 15.19 14.79 0.453 
Educational degree    
 PhD 0.09 0.03 0.000 
 university 0.32 0.21 0.000 
 university of applied sciences 0.23 0.18 0.087 
 university of corporate education 0.02 0.02 0.911 
 commercial college 0.06 0.05 0.468 
 master craftsman 0.23 0.30 0.009 
 vocational training 0.28 0.31 0.264 
 no vocational training 0.02 0.10 0.243 
Field of specialisation    
 natural sciences 0.22 0.19 0.196 
 engineering and technology 0.53 0.57 0.128 
 social sciences 0.34 0.28 0.032 
 humanities 0.05 0.04 0.155 
Own patents before start-up 0.05 0.02 0.000 
Female entrepreneur 0.20 0.17 0.316 
Entrepreneur with migration background 0.07 0.06 0.614 
Team foundation 0.43 0.26 0.000 
Entrepreneur’s position at previous employer    
 executive director 0.17 0.14 0.129 
 executive employee 0.68 0.57 0.000 
 other employee 0.25 0.35 0.001 
Entrepreneur’s business unit at previous employer    
 production/provision of services 0.76 0.81 0.064 
 sales 0.34 0.28 0.036 
 administration 0.22 0.18 0.147 
 research 0.19 0.09 0.000 
Size of previous employer (number of employees) 9,116.47 5,790.08 0.209 
Number of observations 302 2,849  
a Continuous variables: p-value of a t-test for difference in means; indicator variables: Pearson’s ² test on independence. 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 15: Means of explanatory variables after matching (baseline model) 
 spinoffs control group of non-spinoffs p-value
 a 
Age of the (oldest) entrepreneur at start-up (in years) 41.22 42.06 0.265 
Entrepreneur’s industry experience at start-up (in years) 17.63 18.69 0.156 
Educational degree    
 PhD 0.08 0.07 0.749 
 university 0.31 0.29 0.716 
 university of applied sciences 0.23 0.18 0.178 
 university of corporate education 0.02 0.02 0.779 
 commercial college 0.06 0.06 1.000 
 master craftsman 0.23 0.22 0.617 
 vocational training 0.29 0.32 0.364 
 no vocational training 0.02 0.04 0.101 
Field of specialisation    
 natural sciences 0.22 0.17 0.115 
 engineering and technology 0.53 0.53 1.000 
 social sciences 0.33 0.33 1.000 
 humanities 0.05 0.04 0.554 
Own patents before start-up 0.04 0.04 1.000 
Female entrepreneur 0.20 0.25 0.131 
Entrepreneur with migration background 0.06 0.06 1.000 
Team foundation 0.43 0.37 0.172 
Entrepreneur’s position at previous employer    
 executive director 0.17 0.20 0.389 
 executive employee 0.68 0.65 0.536 
 other employee 0.25 0.25 1.000 
Entrepreneur’s business unit at previous employer    
 production/provision of services 0.78 0.79 0.762 
 sales 0.33 0.37 0.293 
 administration 0.21 0.27 0.118 
 research 0.17 0.17 0.911 
Size of previous employer (number of employees) 9,279.63 13,194.95 0.379 
Number of observations 287 287  
a Continuous variables: p-value of a t-test for difference in means; indicator variables: Pearson’s ² test on independence. 
Descriptive statistics based on the matched sample with employment growth rate as outcome variable. 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 16: Fully integrated linear model: Interaction effects 
Dependent variable R&D (0/1) R&D intensity product  innovation 
 coeff.  coeff.  coeff.  
Age of the (oldest) founder at start-up (ln) -1.976  -0.760  1.450  
Age of the (oldest) founder at start-up (ln)2 0.283  0.119  -0.197  
Founder’s industry experience at start-up (ln) -0.053  0.073 * 0.089  
Founder’s industry experience at start-up (ln)2 0.012  -0.017  -0.024  
Educational degree       
 PhD 0.083  0.057  -0.000  
 university -0.081  0.001  -0.045  
 university of applied sciences -0.047  -0.035  -0.018  
 university of corporate education 0.118  -0.015  0.414 ** 
 commercial college -0.068  -0.022  -0.075  
 master craftsman -0.014  0.011  0.066  
 vocational training -0.035  -0.009  -0.126  
 no vocational training 0.296  0.388 ** -0.137  
Field of specialisation       
 natural sciences 0.069  0.028  0.079  
 engineering and technology 0.135 * 0.036 * 0.153 * 
 social sciences 0.102  0.039 * 0.053  
 humanities 0.138  0.017  0.030  
Own patents before start-up -0.044  -0.022  0.068  
Female founder -0.069  -0.007  -0.040  
Founder with migration background -0.082  -0.019  0.125  
Team foundation -0.016  -0.010  -0.059  
Founder’s position at previous employer       
 executive director 0.041  0.041  0.086  
 executive employee 0.175  0.060  0.081  
 other employee 0.151  0.048  -0.004  
Founder’s business unit at previous employer       
 production/provision of services 0.066  0.003  0.092  
 sales 0.035  0.012  -0.131 * 
 administration -0.101  -0.017  0.036  
 research -0.033  -0.006  0.163 * 
Size of previous employer (ln(number of employees)) 0.022  0.004  -0.014  
Size of previous employer (ln(number of employees))2 -0.000  -0.001  0.001  
Number of observations 3,145 2.444 3,137 
R2 0.246 0.221 0.088 
Note: Baseline model; common support condition applies. ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respec-
tively; additional interactions: dummy variables for industry sector, year of firm formation, firms promoted by KfW. 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
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Table 17: Probit estimation of the probability of being a start-up for which specific skills are 
essential 
 marginal effect robust standard error 
 
Age of the (oldest) founder at start-up (ln) 1.355 0.933  
Age of the (oldest) founder at start-up (ln)2 -0.178 0.128  
Founder’s industry experience at start-up (ln) 0.167 0.040 *** 
Founder’s industry experience at start-up (ln)2 -0.033 0.010 *** 
Educational degree    
 PhD 0.020 0.059  
 university 0.050 0.039  
 university of applied sciences 0.023 0.037  
 university of corporate education 0.040 0.067  
 commercial college 0.094 0.052 * 
 master craftsman 0.065 0.036 * 
 vocational training 0.044 0.036  
 no vocational training -0.028 0.093  
Field of specialisation    
 natural sciences 0.009 0.032  
 Engineering and technology -0.020 0.029  
 social sciences -0.018 0.029  
 humanities -0.043 0.047  
Own patents before start-up -0.037 0.062  
Female founder 0.026 0.025  
Founder with migration background 0.002 0.036  
Team foundation 0.010 0.027  
Founder’s position at previous employer    
 executive director 0.100 0.045 ** 
 executive employee 0.113 0.040 *** 
 other employee 0.028 0.042  
Founder’s business unit at previous employer    
 production/provision of services 0.043 0.024 * 
 sales 0.039 0.022 * 
 administration 0.009 0.024  
 research -0.029 0.031  
Size of previous employer (ln(number of employees)) -0.013 0.011  
Size of previous employer (ln(number of employees))2 0.001 0.001  
Industry (ref. wholesale and retail trade)    
 cutting-edge technology manufacturing -0.010 0.047  
 high-tech manufacturing 0.018 0.053  
 technology-intensive services 0.051 0.034  
 software supply and consultancy 0.067 0.047  
 non-high-tech manufacturing 0.013 0.036  
 skill-intensive services 0.083 0.045 * 
 other business-oriented services 0.006 0.051  
 consumer-oriented services 0.009 0.037  
 construction -0.020 0.036  
Year of firm formation (ref. 2005)    
 2006 -0.030 0.024  
 2007 -0.007 0.024  
 2008 0.024 0.027  
Number of observations 2,862 
Log pseudolikelihood -1699.739 
McFadden’s R2 0.032 
***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively and correspond to the test of the underlying coeffi-
cient being zero. Additional control variable indicating firms promoted by KfW included. 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
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Technical Appendix 
The Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA, also referred to as unconfoundedness or selection on 
observables assumption) is essential for the validity of propensity score matching and the interpreta-
tion of the estimated ATT. Unfortunately, the CIA cannot be proven or falsified by means of a statisti-
cal test (Lechner, 1998). However, it is possible to estimate how sensitive the ATT is with respect to 
deviations from the CIA. We conduct Mantel-Haenszel tests of the Rosenbaum bounds as described in 
Aakvik (2001) and Becker and Caliendo (2007). The tests indicate how strongly an unobserved varia-
ble must affect the selection into the treatment so that the estimated ATT vanishes. The presentation of 
the methodology closely follows Becker and Caliendo (2007). 
Let assume that the probability that firm i is a spinoff is given by  
(4) ௜ܲ ൌ ܲሺݏ݌݅݊݋݂݂ ൌ 1|ݔ௜, ݑ௜ሻ ൌ ܨሺݔ௜ᇱ	ߚ ൅ ߛݑ௜ሻ	. 
As before, ݔ௜ is a vector of observable covariates. ݑ௜ is an unobservable variable which, for simplicity, 
is assumed to be binary, ݑ௜ ∈ ሼ0, 1ሽ. Further, it is assumed that F is the logistic distribution. If the co-
efficient  is zero, the unobserved variable ݑ௜ does not affect the probability of being a spinoff and 
there is no hidden selection bias. 
For a matched pair of firms i and j, Rosenbaum (2002) showed that the odds ratio that either of the two 
firms is a spinoff is bounded in the following way: 
(5) 
ଵ
௘ം ൑
௉೔൫ଵି௉ೕ൯
௉ೕሺଵି௉೔ሻ ൑ ݁
ఊ 
Only in the case of no hidden bias (ߛ ൌ 0 and ݁ఊ ൌ 1), do the two firms i and j have the same proba-
bility of being a spinoff as implied by propensity score matching. If the unobserved factor ݑ௜ has an 
impact on the probability of being a spinoff (ߛ ൐ 0 and ݁ఊ ൐ 1 ), the Rosenbaum bounds drift apart. 
Aakvik (2001) suggest using the Mantel-Haenszel test statistics to test the null hypothesis of no treat-
ment effect. For a fixed hidden bias ݁ఊ ൒ 1 and ݑ௜ ∈ ሼ0, 1ሽ, the Mantel-Haenszel test statistics is 
bounded by two known distributions (Rosenbaum, 2002). ܳெுା  denotes the bound of the Mantel-
Haenszel test statistics, assuming that the treatment effect was overestimated. That is, for a positive 
(negative) treatment effect we test whether the smallest (highest) possible value of the treatment effect 
given ݁ఊ is still significant. Accordingly, ܳெுି  denotes the bound of the Mantel-Haenszel test statis-
tics, assuming that treatment effect was underestimated. 
Table 18 shows the Mantel-Haenszel test statistics and the associated significance levels for all out-
come variables for which we found a significant ATT in the baseline model. 23 The test statistics are 
reported both under the assumption of overestimation and underestimation of the ATT. The first col-
                                                     
23 The tests were computed using the Stata programme mhbounds (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). 
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umn of Table 18 shows the fixed value of ݁ఊ in a range from 1.00 to 1.50.24 If ݁ఊ = 1.00 there is no 
hidden bias and the test statistics ܳெுା  and ܳெுି  coincide. Since we only found positive effects of be-
ing a spinoff on the outcome variables in Table 18, the test statistics under the assumption of underes-
timation of the ATT are always significant: The effects were positive without a hidden bias and they 
remain positive in case we underestimated these effects. 
Assuming an overestimation of the treatment effect, the ATT of being a spinoff on R&D activities 
nevertheless remains significant over the whole range of ݁ఊ.25 Thus, the test results confirm a positive 
treatment effect on R&D activities even if we assume that an unobserved variable causes a ‘strong’ 
positive selection bias. The effect on the probability to introduce a product (process) innovation van-
ishes for a ‘strong’ positive selection bias but is still positive at the 10% significance level for a ‘mod-
erate’ selection bias with ݁ఊ	= 1.25 (݁ఊ ൌ 1.20). The effect on the probability to introduce a market 
novelty remains significant at the 10% significance level for a ‘weak’ selection bias only (݁ఊ	= 1.10). 
A ‘moderate’ or ‘strong’ selection bias drives this effect down to zero. 
These results are, however, worst-case scenarios. The tests do not prove that an unobserved variable 
exists. Likewise, they do not prove that in truth there is no effect of a transferred essential idea on the 
probability to introduce a market novelty. Nevertheless, the tests guide us to be cautious when inter-
preting our results. They show that the effect of being a spinoff on the probability to introduce a mar-
ket novelty is not robust if a confounding factor exists. On the other hand, being a spinoff is positively 
related to post-entry R&D activities even in the presence of a ‘strong’ confounding factor. 
 
                                                     
24 There is no a priori rule for the choice of the range of ݁ఊ	. In our case, the chosen range from 1.00 to 1.50 is 
sufficient to demonstrate the effect of a potential unobserved variable. If ݁ఊ ൌ 1.50, firms that are identical in 
their observable characteristics in ݔ௜, could differ in their odds of being a spinoff by a factor of 1.50. For exam-
ple, if the treated firm i has an estimated probability of being a spinoff or 0.70, the probability of the matched 
non-treated firm j could be as low as 0.61. 
25 The test in the form applied in this paper requires binary outcome variables. We therefore used a binary trans-
formation of the variable R&D intensity. The resulting dummy variable takes the value one if the R&D intensity 
is larger than or equal to the mean of R&D intensity and zero otherwise. 
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Table 18: Mantel-Haenszel test of Rosenbaum bounds (baseline model) 
 in-house R&D activities (0/1) R&D intensity a market novelty product innovation process innovation 
݁ఊ ܳெுା  ܳெுି  ݌ெுା  ݌ெுି  ܳெுା  ܳெுି  ݌ெுା  ݌ெுି  ܳெுା  ܳெுି  ݌ெுା  ݌ெுି  ܳெுା  ܳெுି  ݌ெுା  ݌ெுି  ܳெுା  ܳெுି  ݌ெுା  ݌ெுି  
1.00 4.050 4.050 0.000 0.000 3.413 3.413 0.000 0.000 1.932 1.932 0.027 0.027 2.746 2.746 0.003 0.003 2.407 2.407 0.008 0.008 
1.05 3.781 4.327 0.000 0.000 3.205 3.629 0.001 0.000 1.699 2.169 0.045 0.015 2.462 3.035 0.007 0.001 2.155 2.665 0.016 0.004 
1.10 3.522 4.588 0.000 0.000 3.004 3.833 0.001 0.000 1.476 2.394 0.070 0.008 2.190 3.308 0.014 0.000 1.912 2.909 0.028 0.002 
1.15 3.275 4.839 0.001 0.000 2.812 4.029 0.002 0.000 1.263 2.609 0.103 0.005 1.930 3.570 0.027 0.000 1.681 3.143 0.046 0.001 
1.20 3.039 5.079 0.001 0.000 2.629 4.217 0.004 0.000 1.060 2.816 0.145 0.002 1.681 3.821 0.046 0.000 1.460 3.367 0.072 0.000 
1.25 2.813 5.311 0.002 0.000 2.455 4.398 0.007 0.000 0.865 3.015 0.194 0.001 1.443 4.062 0.075 0.000 1.248 3.583 0.106 0.000 
1.30 2.597 5.534 0.005 0.000 2.287 4.573 0.011 0.000 0.677 3.207 0.249 0.001 1.214 4.295 0.112 0.000 1.044 3.792 0.148 0.000 
1.35 2.389 5.749 0.008 0.000 2.126 4.742 0.017 0.000 0.497 3.392 0.309 0.000 0.994 4.519 0.160 0.000 0.849 3.992 0.198 0.000 
1.40 2.188 5.957 0.014 0.000 1.972 4.906 0.024 0.000 0.324 3.571 0.373 0.000 0.782 4.735 0.217 0.000 0.661 4.186 0.254 0.000 
1.45 1.995 6.159 0.023 0.000 1.823 5.065 0.034 0.000 0.157 3.744 0.438 0.000 0.578 4.944 0.282 0.000 0.479 4.374 0.316 0.000 
1.50 1.809 6.354 0.035 0.000 1.679 5.219 0.047 0.000 -0.005 3.912 0.502 0.000 0.380 5.146 0.352 0.000 0.304 4.556 0.381 0.000 
a Binary transformation of R&D intensity, taking the value one if the R&D intensity is larger than or equal to the mean of R&D intensity and zero otherwise. 
݁ఊ odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
ܳெுା  Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
ܳெுି  Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
݌ெுା  significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
݌ெுି  significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel, authors’ calculation. 
 
